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Abstract
We introduce the speculation elicitation task (SET) to measure speculative tendencies
of individuals. The resulting SET-score allows us to investigate the role of individual spec-
ulative behavior on experimental asset market bubbles. The experimental results show that
overpricing in asset markets composed of subjects with a high propensity to speculate (high
SET-score) is signiﬁcantly higher than in markets composed of subjects with a low propen-
sity to speculate (low SET-score). We conclude that speculative tendencies are an important
driver of price bubbles in experimental asset markets.
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1 Introduction
Res tantum valet quantum vendi potest. (A thing is worth only what it can be sold for.)
A rich history of theoretical models in the ﬁnancial literature show that speculative tendencies
of investors can fuel asset bubbles.1 Empirically, however, it remains a challenge to identify
and test the inﬂuence of speculators. Furthermore, the fundamental value of assets cannot be
observed directly. The experimental ﬁnance literature solves this problem by keeping both the
fundamental value and the information ﬂow under direct control of the experimenter (Bloomﬁeld
and Anderson, 2010). But even in controlled experimental asset markets it remains a challenge
to obtain data on speculative behavior and its eﬀect on asset market prices. One reason is that
the price formation process in multi-period continuous double auction markets is dynamic and
endogenous. This complicates the identiﬁcation of speculative tendencies at the individual level.
Despite attempts to identify speculators ex post due to their trading behavior (see further
below), there is no direct elicitation method to measure speculative tendencies in individuals.
In this paper, we oﬀer such a test, the Speculation Elicitation Task (SET). The SET measures
speculative tendencies in a one shot asset market setting, but without market feedback that
may confound price formation. We then use the resulting SET-score to analyze the eﬀect of
individual's speculative tendencies on bubble formation in the Smith et al. (1988) asset market
design.
The SET is based on the bubble game introduced by Moinas and Pouget (2013). It involves
an asset commonly known to have zero fundamental value traded in a sequential market with
three traders. At each point in the sequence, an incoming trader chooses between either (i)
accepting a buy oﬀer and oﬀering it to the next trader in line at a higher price, or (ii) rejecting
the buy oﬀer, eﬀectively leaving the current owner stuck with a worthless asset. The last trader
in the sequence cannot sell the asset anymore. Thus, when buying the asset, traders speculate
on not being last and on being able to sell it to the next trader at a higher price. Traders do
not know their position in the market sequence, but they receive a signal on their position in the
form of the price oﬀered to them: the higher the price, the higher the probability of being last
in the sequence. The bubble game is a similar game-theoretic solution as the centipede game.
Due to backward induction neither trader buys the asset and a price bubble is not able to form.
In their experiments, however, Moinas and Pouget (2013) ﬁnd substantial trading and a
'snowball eﬀect', where the propensity to enter bubbles increases in the required number of
reasoning steps and in the probability not to be last. The authors interpret the latter result
as evidence for some element of rationality in subjects' decision to speculate on higher prices.
Moreover, Moinas and Pouget (2013) show that buying in the bubble game can solve an individual
rationality condition (IRC), i.e., the utility of buying is larger or equal to the utility of not buying,
as long as the believed probability of someone next in line buying is large enough. This reasoning
is captured by the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model of Rogers et al. (2009) in which
traders depart from the no-bubble Nash equilibrium due to the assumption of a less than perfect
payoﬀ responsiveness of others traders and the uncertainty concerning this responsiveness. This
means that even at those prices at which a trader is sure to be last, he is still believed to buy
with a certain probability. Since this probability increases in the oﬀered price, the QRE predicts
the snowball eﬀect described above. Moinas and Pouget (2013) ﬁnd that the QRE provides the
1Early papers assuming rational expectations and full information suggest that investing in a growing bubble
can be rational if a number of restrictions on the asset and trading environment are met (see, e.g., Blanchard
and Watson, 1983). Subsequent heterogeneous agents models (HAM), which allow for trader heterogeneity in
rationality and/or information, echo this conclusion (Froot et al., 1992; Madrigal, 1996; Hong and Stein, 1999).
Here, a central idea is the "greater fool theory" where asset prices that deviate from their fundamental value can
be justiﬁed rationally under the belief that another party (a `greater fool' or `noise trader') is willing to pay an
even higher price (De Long et al., 1990).
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best explaination for the buying behavior in the bubble game, indicating that traders believe
their fellow traders to make mistakes.2 This ﬁnding is in line with the 'greater fool theory' by
De Long et al. (1990) and also applies to our deﬁnition of speculation where a trader buys a
worthless asset based on the expectation that another (noise) trader down the line mistakenly
buys at an even higher price.
To obtain the SET-score from the bubble game, we exploit the bubble game's property of
monotonously decreasing probabilities not to be last by translating the set of buy oﬀers into a
scale measure of the propensity to speculate.3 In contrast to the experimental design of Moinas
and Pouget (2013) in which subjects decide on only one price, we elicit buy orders for every
possible price. If subjects have a high propensity to speculate they buy the asset, even at a high
price. If subjects have no propensity to speculate they never buy, not even at the lowest price. In
our experimental setting, each subject goes through a list of potential prices and decides whether
to buy or not. Subjects start with the highest price to make backward induction more salient.
Moving down the list, the ﬁrst price at which a subject is willing to buy the asset determines the
SET-score; a measure for the subject's maximum propensity to speculate. Following the logic of
the aforementioned QRE, people with high SET-scores should expect higher error rates amongst
their fellow participants than traders with lower SET-scores. This follows from the fact that only
the assumption of higher error rates of others satisﬁes a trader's IRC for buying at high prices.
To test whether and how the individual propensity to speculate impacts the formation of price
bubbles in asset markets, we split the subject population in SET-score tertiles and assign each
tertile to one of three independent but otherwise similar SSW markets.4 We hypothesize that, if
speculation plays a role in driving bubbles, we should observe systematically higher overpricing
in markets with high SET-scores than in markets with low SET-scores. The rationale behind
this hypothesis originates from the fact that the SET and the SSW market are very much related
in the informational aspects, the rational outcome as well as the thought process needed to form
speculative bubbles: in both settings backward induction coupled with full information on the
fundamental value leads to a no-bubble Nash equilibrium. Accordingly, the logic behind the
QRE can not only be applied to the bubble game/SET but also to buying behavior in the SSW.
Speciﬁcally, as with the SET, buying an asset above the fundamental value in the SSW
should only be considered when the assumed probability of reselling for a higher price in one of
the subsequent periods is high enough to satisfy a trader's IRC. Given that traders with high
SET-scores should theoretically assume higher error rates amongst their fellow participants, they
should also be more willing to speculate and buy at higher prices in the SSW. We therefore expect
to see larger price bubbles in SSW markets populated by individuals with high SET-scores than
in markets populated by individuals with low SET-scores.5
Our results show that the vast majority of subjects is willing to speculate following the
backward snowball eﬀect described in Moinas and Pouget (2013). The results from the asset
market experiments show that high SET traders drive asset market bubbles as price deviations
from the fundamental value in the high SET-score markets are statistically and economically
signiﬁcantly higher than in low SET-score markets. These ﬁndings indicate a strong link between
2Moinas and Pouget (2013) also apply a number of other behavioral models to the bubble game data, notably
the the Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium of Jehiel (2005) and the Cognitive Hierarchy model of Camerer
et al. (2004). These models are closely related to the QRE in spirit, but perform worse in ﬁtting the bubble game
data. In this paper, we therefore focus on the QRE model.
3Note that this is not possible in the centipede game, where the probability not to be last is equal to 1 for
each node except for the last node where it is 0.
4By assigning subjects to markets based on their SET-score we follow earlier studies that composed markets
according to trader characteristics to study bubble formation, such as prior market experience (Dufwenberg et al.,
2005) or gender (Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015).
5As the composition of a market is not known, a bubble can be sustained after the ﬁrst period by speculators
who unknowingly feed on each other.
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the average individual propensity to speculate (average SET-score of traders) and the formation
of price bubbles in asset markets.
This paper contributes to and complements recent studies that attempt to identify trader
types and their role in bubbles in experimental asset markets by applying simulations or a scoring
method to SSW trading data ex post (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; Baghestanian et al., 2012).
Although these approaches are intuitive, it is very diﬃcult to detect speculative behavior ex post
in SSW markets. First, it is not possible to control the proportion of speculative traders in the
markets as this proportion can only be detected after the fact. Speculative traders, however,
can behave very diﬀerently, depending on the composition of the market. For instance, when
randomly matched with many fundamental traders, a speculator may not have the opportunity to
exhibit speculative behavior. When using an ex ante approach, as in this paper, it is possible to
control market composition and therefore actively create the possibility for speculative behavior.
Second, an ex post analysis of trader types requires (frequent) trading in a multi-period asset
market in order to have enough data for the identiﬁcation process. As trading behavior in such
asset market setups is highly endogenous, observed speculative behavior may change over periods.
This dynamic complicates the ex post classiﬁcation and identiﬁcation of speculative traders
(Baghestanian et al., 2012). The SET, in contrast, allows to measure speculative tendencies in a
one shot setting, without any feedback from other traders. Third, it is diﬃcult to test the validity
of ex post trader classiﬁcation from asset market behavior as this requires running a second
experimental asset market after the identiﬁcation has taken place in a ﬁrst market. Doing so,
one will inherently run into problems associated with repetition eﬀects of the same task (Haruvy
et al., 2007). Because of these limitations, the question if and to what extend speculators cause
bubbles has not yet been answered conclusively. We add to the current literature by providing
direct experimental evidence that individual speculative tendencies indeed increase the likelihood
for trading behavior that supports price bubbles. With the SET we further oﬀer a new and easy-
to-implement experimental task that can be used to measure subjects' individual propensity to
speculate.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide our general experimental setup
and procedures. In section 3, we introduce the SET-design,the SET-score, and report the exper-
imental results. In section 4, we assign subjects, depending on their SET-score, to three SSW
markets and discuss the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 General procedure in the experiments
Our experimental sessions consisted of three parts to be described in more detail below. In part
one, we elicited the SET-score as well as subjects' beliefs concerning the SET-scores of the other
participants. In part two, subjects with high, medium and low SET-scores traded in SSW asset
markets. In part three, we administered the cognitive reﬂection test (Frederick, 2005) (CRT), a
lottery choice list (Holt and Laury, 2002), a questionnaire with context dependent risk related
questions (Bonin et al., 2007) and questions on demographics. Part one and two were fully
incentivized. In part three, the risk elicitation and the CRT were incentivised.6
A total of 117 students participated in 4 sessions, with 27 subjects in session 1 and 30 subjects
each in sessions 2-4. Each session lasted about 1 hour and 45 minutes and the average earnings
per subject were 22.50 euros. All payments were made in cash and in private at the very end of
the experiment. All tasks were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The sessions were conducted in the period from March
6Find the instructions in section A in the appendix.
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to May 2014 at the NSM Decision Lab at the Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Table A.1 in appendix D provides descriptive statistics of the subjects in the experiment.
3 The SET
3.1 Design
The SET is based on the bubble game by Moinas and Pouget (2013) which consists of a sequence
of three traders who can either accept or reject to buy an asset with a fundamental value equal
to zero for a certain price. Buying the asset for the oﬀered price means investing one euro initial
capital and automatically oﬀering it to the next trader in the sequence. The payoﬀ is either ten
euros if the next trader decides to buy, or zero if the next trader rejects to buy or if no next
trader exists. Not buying the asset means keeping the one euro initial capital. The design is
summarized in ﬁgure 1. If trader three knows his position in the sequence, it is straight forward
that he will reject to buy due to an immediate loss. Knowing this, trader two will reject to buy
as well, and so does trader one. Hence, no one accepts an oﬀer to buy in the no-bubble Nash
equilibrium.
Figure 1: Sequence of the SET
Notes: The ﬁrst trader in line is oﬀered to buy the asset at a randomly drawn price P1 ∈ {100, 101, 102, 103, 104}.
When the ﬁrst trader rejects, the game ends and all traders earn their one euro initial capital. When the
ﬁrst trader accepts, the asset is oﬀered to the second trader in the sequence at a price P2 = 10 × P1, i.e.,
P2 ∈ {101, 102, 103, 104, 105}. When the second trader rejects, the game ends, the ﬁrst trader earns zero, and the
second and the third trader earn the one euro initial capital. When the second trader accepts, the ﬁrst trader sells
the asset and earns ten euros. The asset is then oﬀered to the third trader in the sequence at a price P3 = 10×P2,
i.e., P3 ∈ {102, 103, 104, 105, 106}. When the third trader rejects, the game ends, the second trader earns zero,
and the third trader earns the one euro initial capital. When the third trader accepts, the second trader sells the
asset and earns ten euros. The third trader buys the asset even though being last in the sequence and is unable
to resell. Thus, the third trader loses the one euro initial capital and earns zero.
Traders have no information about their position in the sequence, i.e., each trader has an
equal chance of being either ﬁrst, second or third in the sequence. However, information about
a trader's position in the sequence can be inferred after the price is revealed. The price oﬀered
to the trader in the ﬁrst position is randomly drawn from a set P1 ∈ {100, 101, 102, 103, 104}
with a known triangular distribution.7 The price oﬀered to the second trader in the sequence is
then P2 = P1 × 10, and the price oﬀered to the third trader is P3 = P2 × 10 = P1 × 100. Thus,
7For higher prices an external ﬁnancial investor pays the diﬀerence. Earnings are divided between the ﬁnancial
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for any price oﬀered, Bayes' rule provides the probabilities of being ﬁrst, second or third in the
trading sequence. Note that for an oﬀer P = 106 the probability of being last is equal to one.
As P1 is capped, backward induction rules out a bubble Nash equilibrium given all traders are
rational and this rationality is common knowledge. Hence, independent of whether the traders
know their position in the sequence, neither trader accepts an oﬀer to buy in the no-bubble Nash
equilibrium. Buy decisions are made simultaneously and independently meaning that subjects
have no further information on the actions of other traders in their sequence.
To develop the SET-score, we modiﬁed the experimental design of Moinas and Pouget (2013)
in two ways. First, instead of presenting the subjects with just one buy decision at a particular
price, we elicited subjects' buy decisions for each price possible given the set of initial prices. We
asked each subject Do you want to buy the asset at 1, 000, 000?, Do you want to buy the asset
at 100, 000?,..., Do you want to buy the asset at 1?.8 Note that we started with the highest
possible price where a buy decision immediately leads to zero payoﬀ. We used this procedure to
facilitate backward induction. The SET provides a clear switching price PS for which a subject
rejects to buy at prices P > PS and accepts to buy at prices P ≤ PS . To provide a score, we rank
the decisions to buy from 0 (never buy) to 7 (always buy). Our SET-score is then deﬁned by the
rank of the switching price PS , see table 1. For example, the switching price PS = 100 refers to
a SET-score of 3. A low SET-score reﬂects a low propensity to speculate while a high SET-score
indicates a high propensity to speculate. An increasing SET-score implies that subjects try to
sell to a greater fool who is present with a decreasing probability.
Table 1: Construction of the SET-score
Buy at or below price Never 100 101 102 103 104 105 106
Probability of being last (%) 0 0 0 23.08 28.57 46.15 57.14 100
SET-score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Notes: The probabilities of being ﬁrst, second or third in line were rounded to integers in the instructions.
Finer SET-score scales can easily be created by increasing the cap on P1, but doing so is a
two-edged sword. On the one hand, more levels allow for a more elaborate scale as more decisions
are made and more heterogeneity in speculation becomes possible. On the other hand, a design
with many levels might include superﬂuous decisions and could take up too much time. A second
change we made to the original design of Moinas and Pouget (2013) was tripling the opportunity
costs for speculation. This increase was applied after running pilots using a one euro initial
capital. We found the distribution of SET-scores resulting from this setup to be heavily skewed
towards the higher SET scores indicating a higher propensity to speculate. Subjects only needed
to presume a small winning probability (at least 1/10) to let the expected earnings from buying
exceed one euro. With the calibration to three euro, subjects have to presume a probability of at
least 3/10, which allows us to better diﬀerentiate between speculation types in the population.9
After the SET, subjects were asked to state their beliefs regarding the SET-scores of the other
session participants. For each possible buying price, subjects had to state their belief about how
many of their fellow subjects in the same session started buying at that point. Accuracy of
beliefs was incentivised as explained in the instructions in section A.4 in the appendix (incl. a
screenshot).
investor and the participant such that the participant always earn 10 euro. See Moinas and Pouget (2013) for
details.
8Please see the screen shot and additional explanations in the appendix A.
9In fact, with a starting capital of three euro the distribution of SET-scores shifted more towards the center,
meaning that subjects were responsive (in the expected direction) to increased opportunity costs. The results
from the pilot with one euro starting capital are available upon request.
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3.2 Implementation
After subjects entered the lab, instructions on the bubble game (the basics of the SET) were
read aloud (see section A.1), followed by on-screen comprehension questions (see appendix A.2).
Subject were given time to complete seven comprehension questions. We allowed several attempts
to answer, but a subject could only move on to the next question once the current question
had been answered correctly. Then the correct answers were publicly announced and thoroughly
explained. After having explained the basics of the SET, we provided the procedural instructions
on the subjects' screen (see appendix A). These instructions made clear that the bubble game
has to be played not for one but for all possible prices, and that one price would be randomly
chosen to calculate their earnings. We clearly indicated that these on-screen instructions were
the same for all participants. To get a consistent buy decision for the whole list of prices, we
clearly communicated that if subjects decide to buy at a certain price PS , they are assumed to
also buy for each price below P . We allowed subjects to check and revise their decisions before
conﬁrming their ﬁnal decision. The ﬁnal payoﬀ (paid out at the end of the experiment) for a
subject i was calculated as follows. First, one of the seven prices was randomly drawn with equal
probability to be the price the trader faced. Second, subject i's position was randomly drawn.
Third, the remaining two positions were ﬁlled with two randomly drawn subjects j and k from
the subjects in the room. Finally, subject i's payoﬀ was calculated on the basis of all the three
subjects' decisions.10
3.3 Results
Figure 2 shows the distribution of SET-scores for all 117 subjects. Less than three percent chose
not to buy at all while 97 percent of participants did speculate in the SET and were willing to
buy the intrinsically worthless asset. Most subjects chose to buy at prices at or below 1,000
yielding an average SET-score of 3.42. Note that none of the subjects chose to buy at P = 106
(maximum SET-score of 7), where the probability to be last was equal to one, suggesting that
subjects understood the game quite well.11 The latter is also supported by the fact that all
subjects provided the right answers to the seven comprehension questions within the time limit.
We furthermore ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the number of attempts between individuals with
the lowest, middle and highest tertile of SET-scores (see section 4.1 for further details on this
grouping) using a one-sided Jonckheere Terpstra test (P = 0.124).
10Example: Suppose P = 1, 000 was drawn for subject i (suppose i chose to buy), and suppose i is drawn to be
number 2 in line. Then we look at the decision of subject j for P = 100 (suppose j chose to buy) and of subject
k for P = 10, 000 (suppose k chose not to buy). Now the payoﬀ for subject i is calculated according the decisions
of all three (which is zero as k rejected to buy and i purchased from j).
11Also, only one subject (less than one percent of all subjects) bought at a SET-score of 6 (second highest
price).
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Figure 2: SET- score distribution
To investigate whether individual measures explain speculative tendencies in the SET, we ran
an OLS regression with the SET-scores as dependent variable and all demographic variables and
other measures elicited in part three of the experiment as independent variables. As the results
in Table 2 show, the demographic control variables, as well as the CRT and the risk attitude
measures from Holt and Laury (2002) and Bonin et al. (2007) are not statistically signiﬁcant. A
subject's belief about the others' SET-score, however, is signiﬁcantly and positively correlated
with a subject's own SET-score. Hence, on average, and in accordance with the greater fool
theory, subjects who believe that others choose a higher PS also choose a higher PS themselves.
Given the strong predictive power, we take a closer look at subjects' beliefs about others' SET-
score. Looking at the chosen switching price, we observe that, given their beliefs regarding the
switching points of the others, 84.6 percent of all subjects are within one step of their optimal
decision under the expected utility framework assuming risk neutrality.12 We furthermore ﬁnd
that more than 92 percent of subjects obtain a positive expected surplus (deﬁned as the expected
gain of buying minus the three euros obtained by deciding not to buy at all) of, on average, 1.63
euros. These results show that subjects indeed behave in accordance with their beliefs and seem
to expect that, on average, a greater fool next in line will buy the asset from them.
12Going from a price of 1 to a price of 10 counts as 1 step, going from a price 1 to a price of 100 counts as 2
steps etc.. Please see appendix F for more information on the calculation of the optimal buy prices.
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Table 2: Regression results on the SET-score.
(1) (2)
Dependent SET score SET score
Session 2 -0.388* -0.271
(0.226) (0.243)
Session 3 -0.263 -0.137
(0.252) (0.264)
Session 4 -0.167 0.019
(0.240) (0.247)
Belief SET 0.581*** 0.563***
(0.106) (0.108)
CRT -0.100
(0.061)
Holt Laury -0.019
(0.046)
General Risk 0.076
(0.052)
Age 0.018
(0.038)
Female 0.210
(0.172)
Foreign 0.185
(0.234)
Econ -0.042
(0.472)
Constant 1.757*** 1.118
(0.429) (1.061)
Observations 117 117
R-squared 0.318 0.375
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Notes: Belief SET is the average believed SET score of others elicited at the end of part 1 of the experiment.
Foreign is a dummy capturing a non-Dutch place of birth. Econ is a dummy for studying economics or business.
The reported results do not change qualitatively when including the risk questions from Bonin et al. (2007).
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
4 SSW Markets
4.1 Market composition and implementation
To consider the eﬀect of speculation on price bubbles, we compare trading behavior in SSW
markets composed of subjects who scored high in the SET to trading behavior in markets com-
posed of subjects who scored low in the SET. In each session (N = 30 or N = 27), we ranked
the elicited SET-scores from part one and split them into tertiles. The N/3 subjects with the
highest SET-scores, representing the tertile of the session population with the highest propensity
to speculate, were assigned to one market, henceforth H-market. The N/3 subjects with the
lowest SET-scores, representing the tertile of the session population with the lowest propensity
to speculate, were assigned to another market, henceforth L-market. The remaining subjects
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were assigned to a third market with medium SET-scores, henceforth M-market. In case of
ties, subjects were randomly assigned to one of either markets. Subjects knew that they were
assigned to three separate markets of equal size, but were not aware of the fact that markets are
composed in a certain way.13 Hence, we are able to compare the performance of three SSW mar-
kets, diﬀerentiated by the population's propensity to speculate into L-/M-/H-markets, leaving
all other parameters constant (even the stream of dividend payments).
As shown in table 3, the average SET-score in markets L, M, and H is 2.38, 3.63, and 4.32,
respectively. To test whether SET-scores are indeed increasing from markets L to H, we use a
one-sided Jonckheere Terpstra test in each session as SET-scores are independent across markets.
We can reject the Null that no trend from L to H exist in each session in favor of the alternative
that SET-scores increases from L to H (p < 0.001). Comparing only the L-markets to the H-
markets, a Mann Whitney U test conﬁrms statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in SET-scores for
each individual session as well (p < 0.001 in each session).
Table 3: SET-score descriptives.
MARKET SET-Score Mann Whitney U test
Avg: L vs. M 2.38 vs. 3.63 0.000
Avg: M vs. H 3.63 vs. 4.32 0.000
Avg: H vs. L 4.32 vs. 2.38 0.000
S1: L vs. M 2.5 vs. 4 0.001
S1: M vs. H 4 vs. 4.67 0.059
S1: H vs. L 4.67 vs. 2.5 0.000
S2: L vs. M 2.5 vs. 3 0.063
S2: M vs. H 3 vs. 4.2 0.000
S2: H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2.5 0.000
S3: L vs. M 2 vs. 3.7 0.000
S3: M vs. H 3.7 vs. 4.2 0.105
S3: H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2 0.000
S4: L vs. M 2.5 vs. 3.8 0.000
S4: M vs. H 3.8 vs. 4.2 0.051
S4: H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2.5 0.000
Notes: N=117. 'Avg' indicates average per market type (L, M, H) across all sessions (S). 'S1-L' stands for session
1, market 'L'. Each separate market consisted of 10 participants (session one had 10, 9, and 8 due to no-shows).
Before trading in the SSW market, subjects had a neutral trial period of 5 minutes to get
used to the trading platform.14 After the trial the traders entered the SSW market which we
implemented in line with the standard literature (see Palan, 2013). Traders were able to buy and
sell shares during a sequence of 15 double-auction trading periods, each lasting three minutes. At
the end of every period, each share paid a dividend of 0, 8, 28, or 60 francs with equal probability.
Note that the random draw for the dividend payment applied to all three markets resulting in
identical dividends across all three markets within a session. Since the expected dividend equals
24 francs in every period, the fundamental value in period t equals 24 × (16t), i.e. 360 francs
in period 1, 336 francs in period 2, ... and 24 francs in period 15. The initial endowments were
13In line with previous studies, e.g. Cheung et al. (2014); Levine et al. (2014), subgroups are composed without
public knowledge on the determinants of selection. This ensures that our treatment variable, the degree of
speculative tendency (average SET-score), constitutes the only diﬀerence between markets.
14For instructions see appendix B.
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equal for all subjects and amounted to an initial cash balance of 2000 francs and two shares.15
The exchange rate used was 300 francs for 1 euro.
4.2 Results
Figure 3 shows the diﬀerence between the median price path and the fundamental value, averaged
over all four sessions for markets L, M, and H.16 The ﬁgure clearly shows a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in price bubbles between the L-markets and the H-markets: the average deviation from the
fundamental value stays well below 100 francs in the L-markets, while the average price in the
H-markets starts at 100 francs deviation and then clearly bubbles to more than 250 francs above
fundamental value. The M-markets also bubble, but less than the H-markets and with a lower
peak: the average M-prices stay between L and H for the ﬁrst 12 out of 15 periods. In the last
three periods, the M- and the H-markets follow a very similar price path as they converge to the
fundamental value after their bubbles burst.17
Figure 3: Time series of transaction price diﬀerences to fundamental value
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the average of median session prices of markets L, M, and H and the fundamental value
(as solid horizontal line).
To measure the magnitude of price bubbles we follow the literature and compute two bubble
measures provided by Stöckl et al. (2010). The relative absolute deviation (RAD) measures
mispricing as the average absolute deviation from the average fundamental value, and the relative
deviation (RD) measures overpricing as the average deviation from the average fundamental
value.18 Table 4 reports the RAD and RD by market and by session, and the average over all
15Deviating from the 'Design 4' parameters used in the literature, we increased the cash-to-asset ratio to allow
for higher price bubbles in the markets (see, e.g., Haruvy and Noussair, 2006).
16See appendix C for session-speciﬁc price paths.
17Note that in contrast to earlier experiments price deviations are positive from the start as suﬃcient cash was
available right from the beginning.
18The RAD is deﬁned as 1
T
∑T
t=1
|Pt−FVt|
F¯V
while the RD is deﬁned as 1
T
∑T
t=1
Pt−FVt
F¯V
.
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sessions.19 RAD and RD have almost equal values indicating that prices are in general above the
fundamental value. In the following we therefore focus on the RD.20 In each session, overpricing
is lower in L-markets than in H-markets. On average, L-markets are overpriced by 23 percent,
while in H-markets the average overpricing is close to 78 percent. Thus, overpricing is more
than three times higher in H-markets than in L-markets. To compare the two markets, we use
a test proposed by Haruvy and Noussair (2006). We treat the diﬀerence between the average
price and the fundamental value in each period of each session as the relevant unit of observation
yielding 15 observations (this assumes that the diﬀerence between price and fundamental value
is independent over periods and results in giving equal weight to all periods in all sessions). We
then evaluate the hypothesis that the diﬀerence in the L-markets is equal to the diﬀerence in
the H-markets using a Wilcoxon signed rank test.21 The results in Table A.3 show that we can
reject the Null for each session and for the average of all sessions (p = 0.011 for session two and
p ≤ 0.001 for all other tests).22 Hence overpricing is signiﬁcantly higher in H-markets than in
L-markets.
While table 4 shows a clear trend in RD in session three and four, this is not the case for
sessions one and two. This is due to the fact that diﬀerences in SET-scores between markets in
the ﬁrst two sessions are less pronounced, as shown in table A.3. In session one, the SET-scores
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between markets M and H at a 5 percent level. This may explain the
lower RD in the H-market. In session two, the SET-scores in the L- and M-market are statistically
not diﬀerent, which may explain the higher RD in the L-market. To test for a trend, we evaluate
the Null that RDL = RDM = RDH against the alternative that RDL < RDM < RDH . As
observations are not independent within a session, we make use of Page's Trend Test (Page, 1963)
with m = 4 and n = 3. We can reject the Null at a signiﬁcance level of 5 percent indicating a
signiﬁcant trend of increasing overpricing as we move from L to M to H.23 Thus, we can conclude
that overpricing signiﬁcantly increases in the average SET-score of the market.
Table 4: Bubble measures.
RAD RD
Session\Market L M H L M H
1 8% 55% 45% 8% 53% 45%
2 25% 15% 71% 19% 11% 69%
3 50% 81% 94% 50% 81% 94%
4 17% 88% 106% 17% 88% 106%
Average 25% 60% 79% 23% 58% 78%
Notes: N=117. Relative absolute deviation is measured as RAD = 1
15
∑15
t=1
|Pt−FVt|
Mean(FV )
, and (the average of)
the relative deviation is measured as RD = 1
15
∑15
t=1
Pt−FVt
mean(FV )
. Each separate market consisted of, on average,
10 participants.
19Table A.2 in appendix D provides further bubble measures used in the literature.
20The reported statistical tests yield qualitatively identical results for the RAD.
21Thus, for each session we evaluated the Null that (PHt − FVt) − (PLt − FVt) = 0, and across sessions we
evaluated the Null that 1
4
∑4
i=1
(PHt,i − FVt)− 14
∑4
i=1
(PLt,i − FVt) = 0 with i being the session ID.
22Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test on the diﬀerences in RD with only four observations, we ﬁnd the diﬀerence
to be weakly signiﬁcant (p=0.068).
23Note that markets in a session may not be completely independent of each other, due to equal dividend draws
across markets and other shared session characteristics, like the weather, the day of the week, or the time of the
day. As markets may be less independent within a session than across sessions we apply Page's trend test to
compare markets. Using Cuzick's Test yields a p-value of 0.031 and a one-sided Jonckheere-Terpstra Test yields
a p-value of 0.014.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced the speculation elicitation task (SET) designed to measure
individual speculative tendencies. We conﬁrm results from Moinas and Pouget (2013) that, even
though assets have zero fundamental value, subjects are willing to buy these asset at positive
prices. The SET does not only elicit decisions for one price, as in Moinas and Pouget (2013),
but for a range of prices. We conclude that the higher a trader's maximum willingness to buy,
as expressed by the SET-score, the higher a trader's propensity to speculate on a 'greater fool',
who will buy at even higher prices.
We applied the SET-score in experimental asset market settings by composing separate mar-
kets with homogeneous trader types having similar low, medium, or high SET-scores. As ex-
pected, we observe signiﬁcantly higher overpricing and bubble formation in high SET-score mar-
kets than in low SET-score markets in all sessions. In fact, we ﬁnd that overpricing in the
H-markets is more than three times higher than in the L-markets. Our results provide evidence
that price bubbles in SSW market designs are at least partly driven by speculative behavior.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the SET is able to elicit and measure speculative tendencies of indi-
viduals. Our approach is distinctly diﬀerent from ex post identiﬁcation of speculative trading
behavior in SSW markets (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; Baghestanian et al., 2012) as the SET-
score measures speculative tendencies of individuals without market feedback and dynamics that
may confound price formation.
The SET is easily implemented in the laboratory and the procedure only takes about 20
minutes. The SET provides us with the SET-score; an easy-to-interpret speculation measurement
at the individual level that enables us to explore the inﬂuence of traders' speculative tendencies
on bubble formation and crashes. Future studies may want to use the SET-score as a treatment
variable (for example, to explore the inﬂuence of speculators on diﬀerent market phenomena) or
as an explanatory variable for trader and market characteristics.
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Appendix
A Instructions: SET & Comprehension Questionnaire
A.1 SET instructions
1. The Exchange Process
To play this game, the computer creates groups of three traders. Each trader is endowed with one euro which can be
used to buy an asset. Your task during the game is thus to choose whether you want to buy or not the asset. This asset
does not generate any dividend. If the asset price exceeds one euro, you can still buy the asset. We indeed consider that
a ﬁnancial partner (who is not part of the game) provides you with the additional capital and shares proﬁts with you
according to the respective capital invested. The market proceeds sequentially. The ﬁrst trader is proposed to buy at a
price P1. If he buys, he proposes to sell the asset to the second trader at a price which is ten times higher, P2 = 10P1.
If the second trader accepts to buy, the ﬁrst trader ends up the game with 10 euros. The second trader then proposes to
sell the asset to the third trader at a price P3 = 10*P2 = 100*P1. If the third trader buys the asset, the second trader
ends up the game with 10 euros. The third trader does not ﬁnd anybody to whom he can sell the asset as he is last.
Since this asset does not generate any dividend, he ends up the game with 0 euro. If you do not or cannot buy the asset
 respectively because you choose not to buy or because the person before you in line does not oﬀer you the asset  you
end the game with 3 euros. This game is summarized in the following ﬁgure:
At the beginning of the game, traders do not know their position in the market sequence. Positions are randomly
determined with one chance out of three for each trader to be ﬁrst, second or third.
2. Proposed prices
The price P1 that is proposed to the ﬁrst trader is random. This price is a power of 10 and is determined as follows:
P1 Probability that this P1 is realized
1 15 %
10 20 %
100 30 %
1.000 20 %
10.000 15 %
traders decisions are made simultaneously and privately. For example, if the ﬁrst price P1 = 1 has been drawn, the prices
that are simultaneously proposed to the three traders are: P1= 1 for the ﬁrst trader, P2= 10 for the second trader, andP3
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= 100 for the third trader. Identically, if the ﬁrst price P1 = 10.000 has been drawn, the prices that are simultaneously
proposed to the three traders are: P1= 10.000 for the ﬁrst trader, P2= 100. 000 for the second trader, and P3= 1.000.000
for the third trader. The prices that are being proposed to you can give you the following information regarding your
position in the market sequence:
 If you are proposed to buy at a price of 1, you are sure to be ﬁrst;
 If you are proposed to buy at a price of 10, you have a 6/10 chance of being ﬁrst, and a 4/10 chance of being
second in the sequence;
 If you are proposed to buy at a price of 100, you have a 5/10 chance of being ﬁrst, a 3/10 chance of being second
and a 2/10 chance of being last in the sequence;
 If you are proposed to buy at a price of 1.000, you have a 3/10 chance of being ﬁrst, a 4/10 chance of being
second and a 3/10 chance of being last;
 If you are proposed to buy at a price of 10.000, you have a 2/10 chance of being ﬁrst, a 3/10 chance of being
second and a 5/10 chance of being last in the sequence;
 If you are proposed to buy at a price of 100.000, you have a 4/10 chance of being second and a 6/10 chance of
being last in the sequence;
 If you are proposed to buy at a price of 1.000.000, you are sure to be last in the sequence.
Please note that all your decisions are completely anonymous as we do not work with names but with numbers.
Are there any questions?
A.2 SET test questions
1) What is probability of being third in line when you have not been oﬀered a price yet?
- Options: (with correct option in bold): 100%, 75%, 10%, 33.33%
2) What is the probability of the ﬁrst price (P1) being 1.000?
- Options: (with correct option in bold): 0%, 15%, 20%, 30%
3) What is the probability of the ﬁrst price (P1) being 100.000?
- Options: (with correct option in bold): 0%, 15%, 20%, 30%
4) If you are oﬀered a price of 1.000, what is the probability of not being last in line?
- Options: (with correct option in bold): 70%, 40%, 10%, 30%
5) What is your proﬁt when you are ﬁrst in line and buy but the person next in line does not buy?
- Options: (with correct option in bold): 0¿, 3¿, 10¿
6) What is your proﬁt if you are second in line and the person before and after you in line buy, but you do not buy?
- Options: (with correct option in bold): 0¿, 3¿, 10¿
7) What is your proﬁt when you are ﬁrst in line, you decide to buy and the trader next in line also buys?
- Options: (with correct option in bold): 0¿, 3¿, 10¿
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A.3 Further SET instructions (shown on screen)
In this experiment we will ask you for every possible price (1, 10, 100, 1.000, 10.000, 100.000, 1.000.000) whether you
would want to buy or not the asset if this price were oﬀered to you in the game that was just explained. You thus
basically play the game not once, but for every possible price. After you have made a decision (buy or not buy) for every
possible price, there are three further steps performed by the computer to determine your ﬁnal proﬁt from this game:
 The computer will randomly pick one of the 7 possible prices, each one is equally likely. Your choice (buy or not
buy) at this price will be used to determine your proﬁt.
 Then the computer will give you a place in line, either ﬁrst, second or third by using the probabilities of being
ﬁrst, second or third in line at the chosen price from step 1. You can ﬁnd these probabilities for all possible prices
in the instructions.
 The computer will couple you to two other traders to complete the trading sequence. As was explained, your
proﬁt also depends on the actions of these two other traders.
Please note: If you decide to buy for a price, we automatically assume you would also want to buy for all lower prices as
these are in fact less risky. Because of this you will see a screen after you have decided to buy on which we tell you that
we assume you automatically also want to buy for all lower prices. If this is indeed the case, simply click on "continue".
However if you want to change your previous decision you can always go back to that decision by clicking on "change".
Figure A.1: Screenshot of the SET decision environment.
A.4 Belief elicitation task instructions (shown on screen)
You have just played a game where you had to decide for 7 diﬀerent prices whether or not you wanted to buy the asset.
Could you indicate below for which price you think the other participants STARTED to buy? Please do so by assigning
the number of participants who you think STARTED buying at a particular price and then pressing the "assign" button.
For example: if you think 12 participants started buying at a price of 1000 (which of course means they also bought for
all lower prices) you ﬁll in 12 next the the price of 1000 and press assign. If you think some people never bought the
asset, you should assign them to the "never" category. Make sure you assign ALL other participants to a category (you
can check this on the right side of your screen). You can always change your choices by typing a diﬀerent number and
pressing on the "assign" button once more. Once you have assigned all the other participants, please click the "continue"
button.You will earn 3 euros if you predict the prices at which the others STARTED buying correctly for more than
90% of the participants, 2 euros if you predict them correctly for between 75%-90% of the participants and 1 euro if you
predict them correctly for between 50%-75% of the participants. REMINDER: You yourself started buying at a price of
: <insert price at which a subject started buying in the SET>
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Figure A.2: Screenshot of the belief elicitation task after the SET.
B Instructions: SSW Asset Market
1. General instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. If you follow the instructions and make good decisions,
you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The
experiment will consist of a sequence of trading periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell shares.
Money in this experiment is expressed in francs (300 francs = 1 euro).
2. How to use the computerized market
The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. On the top panel of your computer screen you
can see the Money you have available to buy shares and the number of shares you currently have.
If you would like to oﬀer to sell a share, use the text area entitled Enter Sell price. In that text area you can enter
the price at which you are oﬀering to sell a share, and then select Submit Sell Price. Please do so now. You will notice
that around 30 numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the column entitled Sell Price. The lowest
sell price will always be on the top of that list and will be highlighted. If you press BUY, you will buy one share for
the lowest current sell price. You can also highlight one of the other prices if you wish to buy at a price other than the
lowest. Please try to purchase a share now by highlighting a price and selecting BUY. Since each of you had put a
share for sale and attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you started
out with. This is because you bought one share and you sold one share.
If you would like to oﬀer to buy a share, use the text area entitled Enter Buy price. In that text area you can enter
the price at which you are oﬀering to buy a share, and then select Submit Buy Price. Please do so now. You will notice
that again around 30 numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the column entitled Buy Price. The
highest price will always be on the top of that list and will be highlighted. If you press SELL, you will sell one share
for the highest current buy price. You can also highlight one of the other prices if you wish to sell at a price other than
the highest. Please sell a share now by highlighting a price and selecting SELL. Since each of you had put a share for
purchase and attempted to sell a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you started out
with. This is because you sold one share and you bought one share.
There are 2 ways to sell a share: Choose a buy price and press SELL or submit a Sell oﬀer yourself.
There are 2 ways to buy a share: Choose a sell price and press BUY or submit a buy oﬀer yourself.
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase, but your number of shares increase by
one. When you sell a share, your Money increases by the price of the sale, but your number of shares decrease by one.
Purchase prices are displayed in the middle section of your screen and are ranked by price. You will now have a practice
period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not inﬂuence your position later
in the experiment. The goal of the practice period is only to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you
have successfully submitted buy prices and sell prices. Also be sure that you have accepted both buy and sell prices.
You are free to ask questions, by raising your hand during the practice period.
3. Speciﬁc instructions for this experiment
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods, you will receive 2500 francs in money as well as two shares at the
beginning of the experiment. In each period. Each period lasts for 180 seconds, in which you may buy and sell shares.
Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of shares carries over from one trading period to the next.
You may receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading periods.
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At the end of each trading period, including period 15 the computer randomly draws a dividend for the period. Each
period, each share you hold at the end of the period:
 earns you a dividend of 0 francs with a probability of 25%
 earns you a dividend of 8 francs with a probability of 25%
 earns you a dividend of 28 francs with a probability of 25%
 earns you a dividend of 60 francs with a probability of 25%
Each of the four numbers is equally likely. The average expected dividend in each period is 24. The dividend is added
to your cash balance automatically. After the last dividend is paid at the end of period 15, there will be no further
earnings possible from shares.
4. Average Holding Value Table
You can use the following table to help you make decisions:
Ending Current Number of
Ö
Average Dividend
=
Average Value per
Period Period Holding Periods per Period Share in Inventory
15 1 15 Ö 24 = 360
15 2 14 Ö 24 = 336
15 3 13 Ö 24 = 312
15 4 12 Ö 24 = 288
15 5 11 Ö 24 = 264
15 6 10 Ö 24 = 240
15 7 9 Ö 24 = 216
15 8 8 Ö 24 = 192
15 9 7 Ö 24 = 168
15 10 6 Ö 24 = 144
15 11 5 Ö 24 = 120
15 12 4 Ö 24 = 96
15 13 3 Ö 24 = 72
15 14 2 Ö 24 = 48
15 15 1 Ö 24 = 24
There are 5 columns in the table. The ﬁrst column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the
experiment. The second column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the average holding value
is being calculated. The third column gives the number of holding periods from the period in the second column until
the end of the experiment. The fourth column, labeled Average Dividend per Period, gives the average amount that the
dividend will be in each period for each unit held in your inventory. The ﬁfth column, labeled Average Holding Value Per
Unit of Inventory, gives the average value for each unit held in your inventory from now until the end of the experiment.
That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you will earn on average the
amount listed in column 5.
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend on a Share has a 25% chance of being 0, a
25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28 and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average
24 per period for each Share. If you hold a Share for 7 periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on
average 7*24 = 168. Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 7 periods is on average 168.
5. Making predictions
In addition to the money you earn from dividends and trading, you can make money by accurately forecasting the average
trading price for the next period. You will indicate your forecasts before each period begins on the computer screen.
The money you receive from your forecasts will be calculated in the following manner :
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Accuracy Your Earnings
Within 10% of actual average price 50 francs
Within 25% of actual average price 20 francs
Within 50% of actual average price 10 francs
6. Your earnings
Your earnings for this part of the experiment will equal the amount of cash that you have at the end of period 15, after
the last dividend has been paid, plus the money you made with your price predictions. The amount of cash you will
have is equal to:
Money you have at the beginning of the experiment + Dividends you receive + Money received from sales of shares -
Money spent on purchases of shares + Earnings from all price predictions
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C Additional ﬁgures
(a) Price paths for session 1. (b) Price paths for session 2.
(c) Price paths for session 3. (d) Price paths for session 4.
Figure A.3: Price paths
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D Additional tables
Table A.1: Subject pool descriptives.
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. dev.
Age 20.85 20 18 28 2.24
Female 46.61% - - - -
Foreign 11.97% - - - -
Economics 93.16% - - - -
Risk attitude (Holt & Laury) 5.73 6 3 10 1.55
General Risk 6.49 7 1 11 1.98
CRT-score 1.66 2 0 3 1.06
Notes: N=117. 'Economics' stands for the percentage of economics students in our population. 'Risk attitude
(Holt & Laury)' represents the number of the row where a subject ﬁrst switched from lottery A to lottery B (see
appendix section E). 'General risk' indicates the answer on a Likert scale from 1 to 11 given to the question "In
general, are you willing to take risks?" from Bonin et al. (2007) (the higher the score the higher the willingness
to take risks). 'CRT score' indicates the number of questions correctly answered in the CRT test from Frederick
(2005).
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Table A.2: Bubble measures for all markets. S1-L stands for session 1 market L.
MARKET SET-Score Turnover Amplitude Norm. dev. Tot. disp. Avg. bias APD PD RAD RD RPAD
S1-L 2.50 3.9 0.107 67.2 235.5 15.6 11.8 11.7 0.082 0.081 0.088
S1-M 4.00 6.1 1.442 471.8 1577.5 102.2 98.6 95.8 0.548 0.532 0.702
S1-H 4.67 6.0 0.508 485.5 1295.5 85.8 64.8 64.4 0.450 0.447 0.577
S2-L 2.50 3.5 0.503 227.5 712.5 36.7 35.6 27.5 0.247 0.191 0.222
S2-M 3.00 2.8 0.306 85.2 433.5 20.2 21.7 15.1 0.151 0.105 0.151
S2-H 4.20 10.7 0.761 1503.3 2040.0 132.3 102.0 99.2 0.708 0.689 0.841
S3-L 2.00 3.4 0.611 209.9 1442.0 95.1 72.1 71.3 0.501 0.495 0.583
S3-M 3.70 7.4 0.760 1129.2 2346.0 155.4 117.3 116.6 0.815 0.809 0.848
S3-H 4.20 11.2 0.756 2153.1 2710.5 180.7 135.5 135.5 0.941 0.941 0.958
S4-L 2.50 6.4 0.192 194.6 486.0 32.4 24.3 24.3 0.169 0.169 0.172
S4-M 3.80 4.5 0.817 736.9 2537.0 169.1 126.9 126.9 0.881 0.881 1.169
S4-H 4.20 8.4 1.035 1700.0 3053.5 203.1 152.7 152.3 1.060 1.058 1.279
Avg.-L 2.38 4.3 0.272 221.0 761.7 48.2 38.1 36.2 0.295 0.251 0.281
Avg.-M 3.63 6.1 0.416 420.1 1282.0 84.7 64.1 63.5 0.445 0.441 0.481
Avg.-H 4.32 9.1 0.633 1252.6 2012.0 132.9 100.6 99.7 0.699 0.692 0.786
Notes: N=117. The bubble measures deﬁned are as: Turnover =
∑15
t=1
# of Tradest
TSU
; Amplitude =
maxt (Pt−FVt)
FV1
− mint (Pt−FVt)
FV1
; Normalized deviation =∑15
t=1
(|Pt−FVt|)( # of Tradest)
TSU
; TotalDispersion =
∑15
t=1
| median (Pt) − FVt |; AverageBias = 115
∑15
t=1
(median (Pt)− FVt) ; APD = 1TSU
∑15
t=1
|
Pt −FVt |; PD = 1TSU
∑15
t=1
(Pt − FVt) ; RAD = 115
∑15
t=1
|Pt−FVt|
mean (FV )
; RD = 1
T
∑15
t=1
(Pt−FVt)
mean (FV )
; RPAD = 1
15
∑15
t=1
|Pt−FVt|
FVt
. Total stock of units (TSU)
is equal to the number of stock per subject times the number of subject in a market. Each separate market consisted of on average 10 participants.
2
2
Table A.3: Results of the Mann Whitney U test for diﬀerences in the SET scores and the Wilcoxon
test for both diﬀerences in the RAD and RD values for selected markets.
MARKET SET-score RAD RD
S1: L vs. M 0.001 0.002 0.006
S1: M vs. H 0.059 0.648 0.231
S1: H vs. L 0.000 0.001 0.002
S2: L vs. M 0.063 0.117 0.753
S2: M vs. H 0.000 0.001 0.001
S2: H vs. L 0.000 0.009 0.011
S3: L vs. M 0.000 0.006 0.005
S3: M vs. H 0.105 0.221 0.173
S3: H vs. L 0.000 0.002 0.001
S4: L vs. M 0.000 0.001 0.001
S4: M vs. H 0.051 0.030 0.035
S4: H vs. L 0.000 0.001 0.001
Avg: L vs. M 0.000 0.001 0.001
Avg: M vs. H 0.000 0.002 0.002
Avg: H vs. L 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: N=117. S1-L stands for session 1 market L. Each separate market consisted of, on average, 10 partici-
pants.
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E Risk attitudes and CRT
Risk attitude elicitation instructions (based on Holt and Laury, 2002)
On the left side of the screen you see 10 lines with two lotteries per line: "Lottery A" and "Lottery B".
Both lotteries have two potential outcomes. For every one of the 10 lines, either choose lottery A or
lottery B, depending on which lottery you would rather participate in. Once you have ﬁlled in you
choice for all 10 lines, please click on the "Continue" button. Out of the lines will be chosen at random
and you will participate automatically in the lottery you chose at that line (either A or B). You will
receive the amount of money that will follow from the outcome of your chosen lottery.
Figure A.4: Screenshot of the Holt & Laury task.
CRT instructions (Frederick, 2005)
Please answer the following three questions. You will receive 1.5 euro per correct answer and you have
3 minutes to answer the questions.
 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much (in whole
cents) does the ball cost?
 If it takes ﬁve machines ﬁve minutes to make ﬁve bottles, how long (in minutes) would it take 100
machines to make 100 bottles?
 In a lake, there is an oil stain. Every day, the stain doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the stain
to cover the entire lake, how long (in days) would it take for the stain to cover half the lake?
24
F Beliefs and calculation of optimal prices
1. Calculation of optimal buying prices
We assume an expected utility framework with risk neutrality, which is a conservative
assumption in our setting (see further below), and compute the individually optimal buying
price as follows. For each subject we ﬁrst determine for each possible buying price i
(with i = 1, denoting P = 1, i = 2, denoting P = 10, ....i = 7 denoting P = 1, 000, 000) the
probability of someone buying both before and after a subject n, denoted by Pr(bi,n) and
Pr(ai,n) respectively, given that subject's beliefs about the buying decisions of his N − 1 fellow
participants in a session (taking into account the probabilities of being 1st, 2nd and 3rd at that
particular price). For instance, to determine the probability of someone buying after subject n
at a price of P = 100, we ﬁrst divide the amount of traders believed by subject n to buy at
prices higher than P = 100 by N and subsequently multiply this number with the probability
not to be last at this price (which equals 0.8 at P = 100). We then calculate the expected
earnings from buying at price i for subject n, E(Ei,n), as:
E(Ei,n) = 10Pr(bi,n)Pr(ai,n) + 3(1− Pr(bi,n)). The earnings at each possible buying price i
are equal to E(Ei,n) when subject n buys and equal to 3 when the subject does not buy.
Finally, because buying at some price i automatically implies buying at all prices< i, the total
expected earnings for subject n, denoted E(TEi,n), when starting to buy at some price i are
equal to: E(TEi,n) =
∑i
1
1
7E(Ei,n) +
∑7
i+1
3
7 . The price i at which E(TEi,n) reaches its
maximum deﬁnes the optimal buying price.
2. Optimal vs. actual buying price
Table A.4 shows the percentage of subjects that bought at a particular number of steps too
early/late compared to their optimal buying price (as calculated above) as well as the average
ratio of earnings to optimal earnings and the average buy premium (deﬁned as the actual
earnings minus 3 euros) for those subjects. 84.6 percent of subjects buy at most one step away
from their optimal buying price, with the ratio of actual earnings to optimal earnings close to 1
for all subjects, showing a decreasing trend with the number of steps a subjects is deviating
from the optimal buy price. The average buy premium shows the same trend, which is even
more pronounced. Note that all calculations regarding the optimal buying price were made
under the assumption of risk neutrality and are thus relatively conservative compared to
methods using probability weighting such as cumulative prospect theory Tversky and
Kahneman (1992). As probability weighting would increase especially low probabilities Pr(bi,n)
and Pr(ai,n) at which E(Ei,n) is not high enough to satisfy a trader's IRC, probability
weighting would increase E(Ei,n) to the point where the IRC is satisﬁed, increasing the
percentage of optimal decisions.
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Table A.4: Optimal vs. actual buy price.
# of steps from optimal buying price -1 0 1 2 3 4
subjects (%) 5.12 23.93 55.56 9.40 5.13 0.85
Avg. earnings/optimal earnings 0.93 1 0.96 0.91 0.85 0.86
Avg. buy premium (¿) 1.05 1.71 1.68 0.82 0.04 -0.04
Notes: N=117. The number of steps from the optimum in the above table is deﬁned as the number of steps that
a subject's buy price deviates from the optimal buying price, i.e. the actual SET-score minus the optimal SET
score. All earnings (both at the optimal and at the actual buy price) are calculated as explained in this appendix.
The buy premium is deﬁned as the actual earnings minus 3 euros. Hence, a negative premium indicates that, on
average, subjects should not have bought at their indicated price, given their beliefs.
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